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Employers face potential liability for the torts of their employees
under theories of negligent hiring and respondeat superior. Unless
employers can implement drug testing programs, increased drug and
alcohol use and abuse by employees in the workplace threaten to mag-
nify employer liability. This article examines Minnesota's drug test-
ing statute and concludes that the statute stands as a satisfactory
balance between employee privacy interests and employer rights.
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INTRODUCTION
As drug and alcohol testing programs are initiated with in-
creasing frequency, both proponents and opponents are pre-
pared for controversy. Employees espouse a right to privacy.
Employers argue that they want to make their workplaces pro-
ductive and safe. Ira Glasser, the executive director of the
American Civil Liberties Union, stated in an interview:
* The authors are partners of the firm of Robins, Zelle, Larson & Kaplan in
Minneapolis, Minnesota. They would like to express their appreciation for the efforts
ofJan Conlin and Anne Radolinski, without whose efforts this article would not exist.
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Employers do have that responsibility [to provide a safe
workplace] but not the authority to regulate or survey what
their employes are doing off the job. If there is evidence
that a person is drinking on the job or using drugs on the
job, that person can be legitimately fired. But such evi-
dence is not going to be found through these drug tests.
The tests are fairly unreliable, unspecific about what drugs
were used and incapable of determining when they were
used. They cannot determine things such as impairment of
performance or impairment of ability or safety.'
Employers and drug enforcement officials, however, view
employee testing in a different light. Peter Bensinger, former
head of the Drug Enforcement Administration, stated:
Drugs affect people long after they're taken. People who
take a drug on a Saturday or Sunday night and then go to
work on a Monday and believe they're perfectly fine are op-
erating under a delusion. They're going to bring the after-
effects of that drug to the workplace whether they think so
or not. Employers should not have to wait until an accident
happens.
2
The employers' interests in safe and efficient workplaces,
coupled with increasing drug use, have resulted in the initia-
tion of drug and alcohol testing programs across the country.
An estimated twenty-five percent of Fortune 500 companies
now test for illegal drugs,3 which is up from ten percent three
years ago. 4 Two Wall Street firms, Kidder, Peabody & Com-
pany and Smith, Barney, Harris, Upham & Company, recently
became the first brokerage houses to test employees for illegal
drug use.
5
Despite recent erosion in the employment-at-will doctrine,
the law generally allows private employers to discharge em-
ployees at any time for any reason, with or without notice. 6
1. Test Employes for Drug Use, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 17, 1986, at 58
(arguing in opposition to drug testing).
2. Id. (arguing in favor of drug testing).
3. Chapman, The Ruckus Over Medical Testing, FORTUNE, Aug. 19, 1985, at 57, 58.
4. Id.
5. Kaufman, The Battle Over Drug Testing, N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1986, § 6, at 52,
59, col. 1.
6. At-will employment is generally characterized as employment which "may be
terminated by either party at any time, and no action can be sustained in such case
for a wrongful discharge." Skagerberg v. Blandin Paper Co., 197 Minn. 291, 302,
266 N.W. 872, 877 (1936)(quoting Minter v. Tootle, Campbell Dry Goods Co., 187
Mo. App. 16, 27-28, 173 S.W. 4, 8 (1915)). Statutory and common law exceptions,
[Vol. 14
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The employee, however, is not completely deprived of legal
rights in the workplace. Constitutional protection against un-
reasonable searches and seizures generally applies to govern-
mental actions, not private industry. A minority of state
constitutions have privacy provisions. 7 A drug-dependent em-
ployee may find legal protection in the form of the Federal Re-
habilitation Act 8 or similar state laws. The Minnesota Human
Rights Act provides protection for workers suffering from the
disability of alcoholism or drug addiction.9
Minnesota recently enacted a drug testing statute which sets
forth guidelines for employee testing. 10 The statute provides
that random drug testing is prohibited unless the employer has
a "reasonable suspicion" of employee substance abuse or the
employee is working in a safety-sensitive position." 1 This arti-
cle analyzes the legal implications arising from the statute and
the theories under which an employer can be held liable for
negligently hiring (or employing) individuals who abuse drugs
or alcohol. Although the article focuses on the problem of
substance abuse from the employers' perspective, it is not in-
tended to advocate what employers can or should do in the
drug testing context.
I. DRUG AND ALCOHOL ABUSE: NATIONAL STATISTICS
The National Institute on Drug Abuse ("NIDA") has con-
cluded that drug abuse is the most common health hazard in
the American workplace.' 2 This is evidenced by the fact that
nearly two-thirds of those entering the work force for the first
time have used illegal drugs, and forty-four percent of that
two-thirds used illegal drugs within the last year. 13 Addition-
however, have been carved into the employment-at-will doctrine. See, e.g., Phipps v.
Clark Oil & Refining Corp., 408 N.W.2d 569, 571 (Minn. 1987) (recognizing recent
public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine).
7. See, e.g., Cecere and Rosen, Legal Implications of Substance Abuse Testing in the
Workplace, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 859, 865 (1987). State constitutional provisions
protecting an individual's right of privacy are found in Alaska, Arizona, California
Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Montana, South Carolina and Washington.
8. 29 U.S.C. §§ 793, 794 (1982 & Supp. 1987).
9. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. §§ 363.01, subd. 25; 363.03, subd. 6 (Supp. 1987).
10. MINN. STAT. § 181.950 (Supp. 1987).
11. Id. § 181.950, subd. 13.
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ally, statistics show that between ten percent and twenty-three
percent of all workers abuse drugs on the job.' 4 According to
the NIDA October 9, 1986 report, nearly thirty-seven million
Americans, or twenty percent of everyone over the age of
twelve, used illegal drugs in 1985.15 NIDA additionally con-
cluded that one in twenty workers is a current cocaine user and
that ninety percent of cocaine users use it on the job.' 6 One
out of every eighteen employees is a drug pusher.' 7 NIDA has
also found that sixty-two million Americans, or one-third of
the population, has used marijuana at least once.' 8
Despite the concern over drugs, alcoholism is still consid-
ered the most common adult drug problem in the United
States. It is the third leading cause of death behind heart dis-
ease and cancer.' 9 Approximately 1.1 million people were ad-
mitted to state alcohol treatment centers in 1985.20 Statistics
show that an alcoholic's risk of being involved in an industrial
accident is two to three times greater than that of a non-alco-
holic. 2' Up to forty percent of industrial fatalities and forty-
seven percent of industrial injuries can be linked to alcohol
abuse and alcoholism. 2 2  Grievance procedures by workers
who are appealing drug or alcohol-related firings cost employ-
ers an average of $1,050 each. 23 The North Carolina Research
Triangle Institute (RTI) estimates that alcohol abuse caused a
sixty-five billion dollar loss in productivity in the work force in
1983. Drug abuse caused an additional thirty-three billion dol-
lar productivity loss. 24 The RTI also concluded that health
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 2-3.
17. Id. at 3.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 5.
20. Id; see also Holder, Alcoholism Treatment and Total Health Care Utilization and
Costs: A Four- Year Longitudinal Analysis of Federal Employees, J. AM. MED. ASS'N 1456
(Sept. 19, 1986)(study examining the effect of alcoholism treatment services on over-
all health care utilization and costs for health insurance enrollees).
21. Alcohol & Drugs in the Workplace: Costs, Controls and Controversies (BNA) SPECIAL
REP., at 7 (1986) [hereinafter Alcohol & Drugs in the Workplace].
22. Id. Statistics additionally show that U.S. industry lost eighty-one billion dol-
lars in 1984 due to worker accidents. Id. at 8.
23. Id. at 7. The BNA report also concluded that non-alcoholic members of al-
coholics' families used ten times as much sick leave as other employees, and absen-
teeism among alcoholics or problem drinkers is 3.8 to 8.3 times greater than normal.
Id.
24. Id. at 8. Varying figures are quoted in different sources. For instance, the
[Vol. 14
4
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 2 [1988], Art. 6
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol14/iss2/6
EMPLOYERS' PERSPECTIVE
service charges for alcohol problems cost the industry over
eight billion dollars annually. 25 A 1982 survey sponsored by
the National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism esti-
mated that 14.7 million Americans have drinking problems. 26
Half of all "problem drinkers" are working. 27
II. THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE NEGLIGENT HIRING AND
RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR DOCTRINES
At common law, an employer has legal responsibilities for
the protection of its employees. An employer's common law
responsibilities include the following duties: (1) to provide a
safe work environment; (2) to provide safe appliances, tools
and equipment; (3) to warn of dangers of which employees
might reasonably be expected to remain in ignorance; (4) to
provide an adequate number of suitable fellow employees; and
(5) to promulgate and enforce rules for employee conduct
which will enhance work safety. 28 Based on common law,
therefore, employers have a strong argument that drug testing
enables them to protect the health, safety and morale of all
employees by early detection of drug abuse problems and the
prevention of drug-related accidents.
Because a large number of industrial accidents are drug or
alcohol-related, testing provides a powerful deterrent to sub-
stance abuse. Accordingly, the number of industrial accidents
may be substantially decreased. For example, after Pacific Gas
& Electric Company began to use pre-employment drug tests,
on-the-job injuries of construction workers fell forty percent.29
Between 1975 and 1984, employees with drug or alcohol
problems were involved in forty-eight accidents in the rail in-
New York Times quoted RTI as concluding that drug abuse drained sixty billion dollars
from the nation's economy in 1983. See Kaufman, supra note 4, at 53. The Employee
Assistance Society of North America noted a $30.8 billion alcohol-related productiv-
ity loss and a $8.3 billion drug-related loss. Id. at 7; see also Taking Drugs on the Job,
NEWSWEEK, Aug. 22, 1983, at 52.
25. Alcohol & Drugs in the Workplace, supra note 21, at 8.
26. Id. at 13. While demographically alcohol and drug abuse problems are not
limited to a specific segment of the society, research shows that illegal drug use is
most concentrated in the younger sectors of the work force and is more prevalent
among men than women. Id. at 12.
27. Id.
28. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & P. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS § 80, at 569 (5th ed. 1984).
29. Copus, supra note 12, at 6.
1988]
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dustry, causing thirty-seven deaths and eighty injuries.30 Fi-
nancially, these accidents resulted in $20.4 million in property
damages and fourteen million dollars in environmental clean-
up costs.3 ' As a result, Southern Pacific Railway implemented
an alcohol testing program. Since the program began in Au-
gust 1984, Southern Pacific has experienced a seventy-two per-
cent drop in the number of accidents.
32
A. Negligent Hiring and Respondeat Superior Doctrines
In addition to the legal duty to provide a safe workplace, em-
ployers can be held liable for negligently hiring or retaining
employees who prove to be dangerous workers. According to
the Restatement (Second) of Agency,"A person conducting an
activity through servants or other agents is subject to liability
for harm resulting from his conduct if he is negligent or reck-
less: . . . (b) in the employment of improper persons or instru-
mentalities in work involving risk of harm to others."
33
Additionally, comment d of the Restatement provides that if
the dangerous quality of an agent causes harm, liability at-
taches to the principal under the rule that "one initiating con-
duct having an undue tendency to cause harm is liable
therefor."3 4 Similarly, the Restatement (Second) of Torts
33
provides that an employer "is subject to liability for physical
harm to third persons caused by his failure to exercise reason-
able care" in selecting an employee, even if the employee is a
contractor. 3
6
Many jurisdictions have adopted the "negligent hiring" doc-
trine. This doctrine holds that an employer who negligently
employs an incompetent or unfit individual may be liable to
third parties whose injury is proximately caused by the em-




33. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 213, at 458 (1958).
34. Id. § 213 comment d.
35. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 411, at 376 (1977).
36. Id.
37. See, e.g., D.R.R. v. English Enterprises, CATV, 356 N.W.2d 580, 583 (Iowa
Ct. App. 1984) (television franchise held liable for rape by independent contractor);
Hersh v. Kentfield Builders, Inc., 385 Mich. 410, 412-13, 189 N.W.2d 286, 288
(1971) (salesman attacked by builder's employee); Ponticas v. K.M.S. Investments,
331 N.W.2d 907, 912 (Minn. 1983) (tenant raped by manager of apartment); Gaines
[Vol. 14
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compasses a broader range of acts than does the doctrine of
respondeat superior. While the doctrine of respondeat supe-
rior is limited to an employee's acts within the scope of em-
ployment, the doctrine of negligent hiring may encompass
direct liability to third parties. 38 In terms of employer liability,
the increasing use of the broader doctrine is disconcerting.
In Di Cosala v. Kay,39 suit was brought after a boy was ac-
cidently shot in the neck on Boy Scout campgrounds by some-
one who was employed as a counselor at the camp. 40 In
determining whether liability could attach to the employer for
an act outside the scope of employment, the court first noted:
The doctrine of respondeat superior has traditionally been
thought to render the employer liable for torts of one of its
employees only when the latter was acting within the scope
of his or her employment. The scope of employment stan-
dard, concededly imprecise, is a formula designed to deline-
ate generally which unauthorized acts of the servant can be
charged to the master.
4 '
The doctrine of respondeat superior, therefore, focuses on
acts which are so closely connected with what the servant is
employed to do and so reasonably incidental to it, "that they
may be regarded as methods, even though quite improper
ones, of carrying out the objectives of the employment.-
42
Distinguishing between the concepts of negligent hiring and
respondeat superior, the Di Cosala court continued:
[T]he tort of negligent hiring addresses the risk created by
exposing members of the public to a potentially dangerous
v. Monsanto Co., 655 S.W.2d 568, 570 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (employee murdered
tenant in her apartment); Priest v. F.W. Woolworth Five & Ten Cent Store, 228 Mo.
App. 23, 27, 62 S.W.2d 926, 928 (1933) (assault by assistant manager of store); Di
Cosala v. Kay, 91 N.J. 159, 174, 450 A.2d 508, 516 (1982) (shooting by camp coun-
selor); F &T Co. v. Woods, 92 N.M. 697, 699-700, 594 P.2d 745, 747 (1979) (rape by
television delivery man); Otis Eng'g Corp. v. Clark, 668 S.W.2d 307, 309 (Tex. 1984)
(automobile accident caused by intoxicated employee); Estate of Arrington v. Fields,
578 S.W.2d 173, 178 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (hiring of security guard with prior crimi-
nal record); LaLone v. Smith, 39 Wash.2d 167, 173, 234 P.2d 893, 897 (1951) (tenant
assaulted by janitor).
38. See Ponticas, 331 N.W.2d at 912; Di Cosala, 91 N.J. at 168-71, 450 A.2d at 513-
16; Welsh Mfg. v. Pinkerton's, Inc., 474 A.2d 436, 439-40 (R.I. 1984); see also Cutter
v. Town of Farmington, 126 N.H. 836, 840-41, 498 A.2d 316, 320 (1985) (negligent
hiring can encompass direct liability to a third party from misconduct of employee).
39. 91 N.J. 159, 450 A.2d 508 (1982).
40. Id. at 165, 450 A.2d at 510-12.
41. Id. at 168-69, 450 A.2d at 513 (citations omitted).
42. Id. at 169, 450 A.2d at 513 (citations omitted).
1988]
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individual, while the doctrine of respondeat superior is based
on the theory that the employee is the agent or is acting for
the employer. Therefore the scope of employment limita-
tion on liability which is a part of the respondeat superior doc-
trine is not implicit in the wrong of negligent hiring.
Accordingly, the negligent hiring theory has been used to
impose liability in cases where the employee commits an in-
tentional tort, an action almost invariably outside the scope
of employment, against the customer of a particular em-
ployer or other member of the public, where the employer
either knew or should have known that the employee was
violent or aggressive, or that the employee might engage in
injurious conduct toward third persons. 43
In adopting the doctrine of negligent hiring, the court then set
forth two requirements needed to establish employer liability:
The first involves the knowledge of the employer and fore-
seeability of harm to third persons. An employer will only
be held responsible for torts of its employees beyond the
scope of the employment where it knew or had reason to
know of the particular unfitness, incompetence or danger-
ous attributes of the employee and could reasonably have
foreseen that such qualities created a risk of harm to other
persons. The second required showing is that, through the
negligence of the employer in hiring the employee, the lat-
ter's incompetence, unfitness, or dangerous characteristics
proximately caused the injury.44
Minnesota also recognizes this doctrine. In Ponticas v. K.M.S.
Investments,45 a tenant was raped by a manager of an apartment
complex. The tenant, along with her husband, sued the owner
and operator of the apartment complex, alleging negligence in
the hiring of the manager, who had a criminal record. 46 The
apartment manager had general supervision over 198 apart-
ment units and was issued a pass key which admitted him to all
units. 4 7 He had previously been found guilty of burglary and
sentenced to prison.48 The manager had also been fired from
a bus company after only a month and a half for drinking on
43. Id. at 172-73, 450 A.2d at 515.
44. Id. at 173-74, 450 A.2d at 516 (citations omitted); see also F & T Co., 92 N.M.
at 699, 594 P.2d at 747 (theory of negligent hiring grounded upon "knew or should
have known" standard, not actual knowledge).
45. 331 N.W.2d 907 (Minn. 1983).
46. Id. at 907.
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the job and for apparently fighting with his supervisor. 49
In determining whether or not to adopt the doctrine of neg-
ligent hiring, the Minnesota Supreme Court first reviewed the
origin of the negligent hiring theory:
The origin of the doctrine making an employer liable for
negligent hiring, as well as negligent retention, arose out of
the common law fellow-servant law which imposed a duty
on employers to select employees who would not endanger
fellow employees by their presence on thejob. The concept
of direct employer liability arising as a result of negligent
hiring was later expanded to include a duty to "exercise rea-
sonable care for the safety of members of the general pub-
lic" so today it is recognized as the rule in the majority of
the jurisdictions and recognized as the law by Restatement
(Second) Agency § 213 (1958) . . .5
The court further noted:
Liability is predicated on the negligence of an employer in
placing a person with known propensities, or propensities
which should have been discovered by reasonable investiga-
tion, in an employment position in which, because of the
circumstances of the employment, it should have been fore-
seeable that the hired individual posed a threat of injury to
others. 5'
Thus, the court concluded:
We can ascertain no substantial difference in imposing a
duty on an employer to use reasonable care in the initial
hiring from his duty to use that care in the retention of an
employee. We therefore align ourselves with the majority
of those jurisdictions which recognize a claim by an injured
third party for negligent hiring and with the authors of Re-
statement (Second) Agency and hold that an employer has
the duty to exercise reasonable care in view of all circum-
stances in hiring individuals who, because of the employ-
ment, may pose a threat of injury to members of the
public. 52
49. Id.
50. Id. at 910-11 (citation omitted).
51. Id. at 911.
52. Id. (citation omitted). Originally, employers only owed a duty to co-employ-
ees. This duty has now been extended to licensees, invitees or customers of the em-
ployer, and in many jurisdictions, the general public. See, e.g., Greening v. School
Dist. of Millard, 223 Neb. 729, 736, 393 N.W.2d 51, 57 (1986) (third persons); Welsh
Mfg., 474 A.2d at 439-40; Estate ofArnington, 578 S.W.2d at 178 (to other servants and
to the public); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 213, at 458 (1958) (third
19881
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The Ponticas court also noted:
Although an employer will not be held liable for failure to
discover information about the employee's incompetence
that could not have been discovered by reasonable investi-
gation, the issue is whether the employer did make a rea-
sonable investigation. The scope of the investigation is
directly related to the severity of the risk third parties are
subjected to by an incompetent employee.
53
Most jurisdictions also hold that whether an employer exer-
cises reasonable care in investigating an employee's back-
ground is a fact question and involves a determination, inter
alia, of the risk involved and the type of employment sought.
54
B. Employer Liability for Employing Individuals Who Use
or Abuse Drugs or Alcohol
Both the doctrines of "negligent hiring" and "respondeat
superior" have been used to hold employers liable in situa-
tions where their employees, because of intoxication or drug
persons). But cf. Baugher v. A. Hattersley & Sons, Inc., 436 N.E.2d 126, 128 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1982) (plaintiffs, who were neither customers, patrons nor invitees of employer,
were beyond scope of duty owed by employer to public); D.R.R., 356 N.W.2d at 583-
84 (negligent hiring cause of action exists only when the party is a licensee, invitee or
customer of the employer).
53. Ponticas, 331 N.W.2d at 912-13; see also Svacek v. Shelley, 359 P.2d 127, 131-
32 (Alaska 1961) (if employer knew that employee was a dangerous person, or
learned or should have learned of employee's dangerous propensities, employer
would be liable for injuries inflicted by employee on another person).
54. See, e.g., Colwell v. Oatman, 32 Colo. App. 171, 176, 510 P.2d 464, 466-67
(1973) (when an employer selects employees to perform services for third party, em-
ployer must exercise the care of a reasonably prudent person in selecting employ-
ees); Williams v. Feather Sound, Inc., 386 So. 2d 1238, 1240 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1980) (in analyzing employer's responsibility to check out an applicant's background,
it is necessary to consider the type of work to be done by the prospective employee),
petition for rev. denied, 392 So. 2d 1374 (Fla. 1981); Malorney v. B & L Motor Freight,
Inc., 146 Ill. App.3d 265, 268, 496 N.E.2d 1086, 1088-89 (1986) (an employer
should exercise that degree of care reasonably commensurate with perils and hazards
likely to be encountered in the performance of an employee's duty); Shelton v. Board
of Regents, 211 Neb. 820, 828, 320 N.W.2d 748, 753 (1982) (whether or not the
hiring or retention of an employee with a prior criminal record constitutes negli-
gence depends upon the facts and circumstances of each individual's case) (citing
Annotation, Employer's Knowledge ofEmployee's Past Criminal Record as Affecting Liability for
Employee's Tortious Conduct, 48 A.L.R.3d 359, 361 (1973)); Estate of Arrington, 578
S.W.2d at 178 (upholding master's long-recognized duty to make inquiry as to the
competence and qualifications of those he considers for employment, especially
where engaged in an occupation which could be hazardous to life and limb and re-
quires skilled or experienced servants).
[Vol. 14
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use, have injured or assaulted others. 55 Again, however, liabil-
ity is only imposed if the employer, exercising reasonable care,
could have foreseen a potential problem.
56
In Mays v. Pico Finance Co. ,57 a job applicant, who was raped
by an employee, brought suit under the theories of respondeat
superior and negligent hiring.58 She had been interviewed by
the employee, who falsely informed her that she had to meet
the district manager in a nearby town. 59 The employee took
the woman to the nearby town, where he subsequently drank
heavily and then raped her in his hotel room. 60 The court first
rejected the plaintiff's argument that the employee was acting
within the scope of his employment when the rape occurred,
stating, "[The employee] may have given plaintiff the impres-
sion he was acting for [his employer], but he was not actually
doing so."61 With respect to the negligent hiring claim, the
court noted:
[The employer] did not make more than a cursory check of
[the employee's] background. A thorough investigation
would have revealed that [the employee] had pled guilty to
theft, was an alcoholic, and had personality problems.
However, there was no evidence of past sex offenses. The
jury found that [the employee's] past history could not rea-
sonably lead the employer to anticipate that [the employee]
might commit rape. We agree with that finding. Even if the
employer had a duty to protect plaintiff from the actions of
an off-duty employee she originally met at the office, which
is highly questionable, the harm plaintiff suffered could not
have been foreseen. 62
Therefore, because the rape was not foreseeable, the employer
55. See Alexander v. Alterman Transp. Lines, Inc., 387 So. 2d 422, 426 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1980); Pittard v. Four Seasons Motor Inn, Inc., 101 N.M. 723, 728-31, 688
P.2d 333, 336-39 (1984); Chesterman v. Barmon, 82 Or. App. 1, 4-6, 727 P.2d 130,
132-33 (1986), petition for rev. granted, 302 Or. 614, 733 P.2d 449 (1987); G.& H.
Equip. Co., Inc. v. Alexander, 533 S.W.2d 872, 876 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976); LaLone v.
Smith, 39 Wash.2d 167, 171-72, 234 P.2d 893, 897 (1951) (negligent retention).
56. See, e.g., Stein v. Burns Int'l Sec. Serv., Inc., 102 Ill. App.3d 776, 779-80, 430
N.E.2d 334, 337 (1981); Woodward v. Mettille, 81 111. App.3d 168, 183, 400 N.E.2d
934, 947 (1980); Mays v. Pico Fin. Co., Inc., 339 So. 2d 382, 385 (La. Ct. App. 1976),
writ denied, 341 So. 2d 1123 (La. 1977).
57. 339 So. 2d 382 (La. Ct. App. 1976), writ denied, 341 So. 2d 1123 (La. 1977).
58. Id. at 382.
59. See id. at 383-84.
60. Id. at 384.
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was not held liable for the plaintiff's injuries.63
A number of plaintiffs have made claims for punitive dam-
ages in negligent hiring cases. 64 In Stein v. Burns International
Security Services, Inc. ,65 the plaintiff, who was injured by a detec-
tive agency's employee, brought an action to recover compen-
satory and punitive damages for the employer's willful and
wanton failure to make a proper investigation of the em-
ployee's background before hiring him.66 In holding that it
was error to allow the jury to consider the willful and wanton
count for punitive damages, the court stated:
The mere failure to check an applicant's background does
not give rise to an action for punitive damages against de-
fendant. For liability to exist, the conduct of defendant in
failing to check the background must be willful and the con-
duct must exhibit a reckless disregard for the plaintiff's
safety. It is not enough to merely show that the applicant
would not have been hired. Plaintiff must show that if a
proper background investigation had been pursued, the de-
fendant would have discovered facts indicating the propen-
sity of the applicant to do harm. In the present case,
plaintiff at best showed that defendant was negligent in per-
forming a background investigation, and even if a proper
investigation had been performed, defendant would not
have discovered any facts indicating a propensity on [the
employee's] part to do harm. Intoxication during one day
of prior employment and termination because of [the em-
ployee's] failure to show up for work are not facts, standing
alone, that indicate [the employee] had a propensity to do
harm.67
63. Id. at 385-86; see also Woodward, 81 111. App.3d at 183, 400 N.E.2d at 946 (trial
court erred in not allowing evidence of independent contractor's general reputation
of sobriety to be placed before the jury, as such evidence is material to the issue of
whether defendant was guilty of negligent hiring when he knew or should have
known that contractor was an alcoholic); Hemphill v. State Farm Ins. Co., 472 So. 2d
320, 325 (La. Ct. App. 1985) ("employer" held not liable because he neither knew
nor should have known of businessman's and his employee's drinking).
64. See, e.g., Mercury Motors Express, Inc. v. Smith, 393 So. 2d 545, 547 (Fla.
1981); Stein, 102 Ill. App.3d at 777, 430 N.E.2d at 335; Alexander, 387 So. 2d at 422.
65. 102 Ill. App.3d 776, 430 N.E.2d 334 (1981).
66. Id. at 779-80, 430 N.E.2d at 337.
67. Id. at 779-80, 430 N.E.2d at 337 (citations omitted). But see MercwN Motors
Express, 393 So. 2d at 549 (in wrongful death action resulting from drunk employee's
car accident, under the doctrine of respondeat superior, punitive damages may be
imposed on employer with proof of some fault on part of employer which foreseeably
contributed to the plaintiff's injury).
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Similarly, in Alexander v. Alterman Transport Lines, Inc. ,68 a
wrongful death suit was brought against a trucking company
and its employee following a vehicle accident. 69 A jury verdict
was returned for the plaintiff, and the trucking company ap-
pealed, inter alia, the award of punitive damages. 70 The plain-
tiff contended that the evidence showed that the employee
involved in the accident was intoxicated when he appeared at
work on the morning of the accident and that the company
either knew, or should have known, the condition of the em-
ployee when he took charge of the truck. 7' The defendant re-
sponded that, at best, the evidence demonstrated only gross
negligence, which was insufficient for the imposition of puni-
tive damages. 72
In rejecting the defendant's contention, the court first noted
that Florida law permits jury awards of punitive damages
against an intoxicated driver who is involved in an accident
without regard to external proof of carelessness or abnormal
driving. 73 In Alexander v. Alterman Transport Lines, Inc. ,74 an ear-
lier decision on the same case, the court held that the imposi-
tion of punitive damages requires willful, wanton or
outrageous conduct by a driver.75 At trial, therefore, the jury
had been instructed:
If you find that the defendant, Alterman Transport Lines,
Inc., knew or in the exercise of reasonable care should have
known that [the employee] had a record for driving reck-
lessly and carelessly or had a chronic drinking problem or
was under the influence of alcohol immediately prior to em-
barking on his work assignment, then you may find the
defendent Alterman Transport Lines, Inc. liable for puni-
tive damages to the plaintiff.76
In upholding the trial court's instruction, the court concluded:
The evidence conclusively established that Alterman's
driver was visibly drunk at the time of the accident, and,
although conflicting on this point, there was evidence from
68. 887 So. 2d 422 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
69. Id. at 422.
70. Id. at 423.
71. Id. at 425.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. 350 So. 2d 1128 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
75. See id. at 1130.
76. Alexander, 387 So. 2d at 426.
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which the jury could have concluded that [the employee]
was visibly intoxicated when he left Alterman's Orlando ter-
minal at noon on that day. [The employee] himself testified
that he had been out drinking until late the night before,
had consumed alcohol again that morning before going to
the terminal, and that he had consumed no alcohol from the
time he left the terminal in the truck up to the time of the
accident.
77
Thus, the punitive damage issue was properly submitted to the
jury, and the judgment against the company was affirmed.
78
In Pittard v. Four Seasons Motor Inn, Inc.,79 the parents of a
child who was sexually assaulted on hotel premises by a hotel
employee brought an action against the hotel alleging respon-
deat superior, failure to adequately care for the safety of guests
and invitees, failure to provide adequate security, negligent
hiring, negligent retention and inadequate supervision.80 The
employee, Perales, was working at the hotel as a steward assist-
ing in the preparation of banquets."' He admitted to being in-
toxicated when he reported for duty and to further
consumption of alcohol while on duty.82 Perales left the ban-
quet area while on duty and encountered the plaintiff's son
near the hotel's swimming pool area.8 3 He enticed the boy
into a hotel bathroom, locked the door behind them, and sexu-
ally assaulted him.84 The court noted several important factors
for holding Four Seasons liable. First, Perales was on the busi-
ness premises and on-duty. 85 Second, Perales had admitted to
having a drinking problem during the period of employment
with the defendant, and of being violent when he drank.8 6
Third, Perales also admitted to being drunk while on duty on
the day in question.8 7 Therefore, the court concluded:
"There was evidence from which a jury might find that defend-
ant was aware or should have been aware that Perales had a
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. 101 N.M. 723, 688 P.2d 333 (1984).
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drinking problem and a propensity for violence."8 8 Thus, in
reversing the trial judge's judgment for the hotel, the court
stated: "We hold that plaintiffs have introduced sufficient evi-
dence to entitle them to reach the jury. Notice of an em-
ployee's alcoholism and tendency toward violent behavior may
make sexual assault by that employee foreseeable to the em-
ployer. The jury, rather than the judge, should determine
foreseeability on these facts.
'"89
In Chesterman v. Barmon,90 the plaintiff was raped and sexually
abused by Barmon, who was employed by the defendant cor-
poration. The plaintiff brought suit against the corporation for
negligent retention of the employee and vicarious liability for
the employee's actions.9' Barmon was the president of the de-
fendant corporation. 92 As president, he was responsible for
placing bids for construction jobs and deploying the necessary
employees to carry out the work.93 At the time of the incident,
Barmon had been suffering from depression and was having
difficulties at work. 94 He had obtained illegal drugs including
chocolate mescaline and amphetamines from a friend and had
been taking amphetamines at work for about two weeks. 95 On
the night of the attack, Barmon was preparing a bid in a cus-
tomer's backyard when he took a mescaline pill.96 He got in
his truck and began driving, but became disoriented and began
to hallucinate. 97 Unable to drive safely, he stopped and got
out of the truck.98 He subsequently walked to a nearby house
where a friend had once lived, saw the plaintiff, forced his way
into the house, and raped her. 99
The defendant conceded that it was chargeable with the
88. Id.
89. Id. at 731, 688 P.2d at 341. Cf G &HEquip. Co., Inc., 533 S.W.2d at 876 (fact
that employee had been driving his own pickup at the time of the accident was not
controlling in deciding whether or not he was acting within scope of employment and
any intoxication of the employee would not in itself have taken the employee out of
the scope of employment).
90. 82 Or. App. 1, 727 P.2d 130 (1986).
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knowledge that Barmon was taking drugs at work.'00 The de-
fendant employer contended, however, that it was not liable
under a negligent hiring or negligent retention theory be-
cause, under Oregon law, the defendant owed no duty to the
plaintiff.'01 In response, the court noted:
An employer whose employes come into contact with mem-
bers of the public during their employment is responsible
for exercising a duty of reasonable care in the selection or
retention of its employes. Liability is for negligently placing
an employe with known dangerous propensities, or danger-
ous propensities which could have been discovered by a
reasonable investigation, in a position where it is foresee-
able that he could injure the plaintiff in the course of the
work. The duty to use reasonable care in hiring or retaining
employes arises because it is foreseeable that the employe,
in carrying out his employment, may pose an unreasonable
risk of injury to others. 10
2
Thus, to establish that the defendant owed a duty to use rea-
sonable care in retaining Barmon, the plaintiff needed to show
that it was reasonably foreseeable that she would come into
contact with him as a result of his employment. 103 Because the
plaintiff was not a client or potential client, it was not foresee-
able that she would come into contact with Barmon as a result
of his position with the company. 104 Thus, summary judgment
on the issue was proper. 10 5
The Barmon court, however, found that under the facts of the
case, a jury could reasonably conclude that Barmon was acting
within the scope of his employment when he ingested the
drug. 10 6 The court stated:
He was employed to prepare bids for construction jobs. He
testified that he took the drug, because "I started dropping
into this depression, and it was really imperative that I stay
with this bid and get my figures together, and I wound up
taking out the pills." Although he was not hired to take
drugs on the job, ajury could infer that he took drugs as an
intended aid for carrying out the job he was employed to
100. Id. at 4, 727 P.2d at 131-32.
101. See id. at 4-5, 727 P.2d at 132.
102. Id. (citations omitted).
103. Id. at 5, 727 P.2d at 132.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 6, 727 P.2d at 133.
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perform. It was approximately 11 p.m. when he took the
drug. He was at potential customers' home working on a
bid. His wife testified that, on numerous occasions, he
stayed up late to do his work. Therefore, it could also rea-
sonably be inferred that the act in question occurred sub-
stantially within the authorized limits of time and space of
the employment. Further, a reasonable jury could infer
from Barmon's testimony that he was motivated to take a
drug, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the employer by
staying up to finish the bid. Finally, the causation question
is clearly one for the jury.
10 7
Earlier decisions have likewise held employers responsible
for the torts of intoxicated employees. In La Lone v. Smith,' 0 8
suit was brought to recover damages for personal injuries re-
ceived when the plaintiff was assaulted by an employee of the
defendants. The employee in question, Trask, was hired by
the manager of an apartment building to work as a janitor on a
twenty-four hour basis. 10 9 During his employ, he exhibited
signs of dissipation and irresponsibility. 1 0 Furthermore,
Trask was known to have periods of drunkenness and was
quarrelsome and violent when drunk."' Two months before
the assault in question, he had assaulted another tenant who
had notified the manager." 2 On the day of the second assault,
he was apparently intoxicated.' 3 The defendants, however,
argued that neither their employment of Trask nor his reten-
tion after his first assault was the proximate cause of the sec-
ond assault in question."
4
Quoting from the comments to the Restatement of Agency
section 213, the court first noted:
One who employs another to act for him is not liable
under the rule stated in this Section merely because the one
employed is incompetent, vicious, or careless. If liability re-
sults it is because, under the circumstances, the employer
has not taken the care which a prudent man would take in
selecting the person for the business in hand. What precau-
107. Id. at 6-7, 727 P.2d at 133.
108. 39 Wash.2d 167, 234 P.2d 893 (1951).
109. Id. at 168, 234 P.2d at 894.
110. Id. at 169, 234 P.2d at 894-95.
111. Id., 234 P.2d at 895.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 170-71, 234 P.2d at 896.
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tions must be taken depend upon the situation. One may
normally assume that another who offers to perform simple
work is competent. If, however, the work is likely to subject
third persons to serious risk of great harm, there is a special
duty of investigation.
Liability results under the rule stated in this Section, not
because of the relationship of the parties, but because the
employer antecedently had reason to believe that an undue
risk of harm would exist because of the employment. The
employer is subject to liability only for such harm as is
within the risk. If, therefore, the risk exists because of the
quality of the employee, there is liability only to the extent
that the harm is caused by the quality of the employee which
the employer had reason to suppose would be likely to
cause harm.
1 5
Thus, the court affirmed the trial court's judgment, noting:
To the facts of this case, as found by the trial court, we must
apply the rule of law that an employer is liable to a third
person for injuries inflicted upon him by an employee who
had been retained in employment after the employer
knows, or ought to know, that because of his vicious tem-
perament or propensities he is likely to assault persons dur-
ing the course of his employment.
1" 6
In addition to negligent hiring, employers can be held liable
for failing to control the conduct of employees, where the em-
ployer should know of the reason to exercise control. In Otis
Engineering Corp. v. Clark,"17 a wrongful death action was insti-
tuted against an employer after persons were killed in an auto-
mobile accident involving an Otis employee. The employee,
Matheson, who worked the evening shift at the Otis plant, had
a history of drinking on the job and was intoxicated on the
night of the accident."18 A co-worker testified that he knew of
Matheson's drinking problem and that he had told Matheson's
supervisor on the day of the accident that Matheson was not
acting right, was not coordinated, was slurring his words and
that "we need to get him off the machines."' 19 After the din-
ner break, the supervisor told Matheson to go home and es-
115. Id. at 172, 234 P.2d at 896-97.
116. Id. at 173, 234 P.2d at 897.
117. 668 S.W.2d 307 (Tex. 1983).
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corted him to the company's parking lot.12 0 He asked
Matheson if he was all right and if he could make it home.121
Matheson answered that he could. 122 Several miles from the
plant, Matheson was involved in a fatal collision.' 23 After the
accident, a medical examiner showed that Matheson had a
blood alcohol content at the time of the accident of .268%,
which indicated that he had ingested a substantial amount of
alcohol. 24 The plaintiff thus contended that under the facts of
the case, Otis negligently sent home, in the middle of the em-
ployee's shift, an employee whom it knew to be intoxicated.125
Otis moved for summary judgment on the basis that it owed
no duty to the plaintiffs.126 In response, the court stated:
As a general rule, one person is under no duty to control
the conduct of another, even if he has practical ability to
exercise such control. Yet, certain relationships do impose,
as a matter of law, certain duties upon parties. For instance,
the master-servant relationship may give rise to a duty on
the part of the master to control the conduct of his servants
outside the scope of employment. This duty, however, is a
narrow one. Ordinarily, the employer is liable only for the
off-duty torts of his employees which are committed on the
employer's premises or with the employer's chattels.' 2 7
Noting that several recent cases in other jurisdictions had
extended the concept of duty in the area of employer liability,
the Otis court held:
[T]he standard of duty that we now adopt ... is: when, be-
cause of an employee's incapacity, an employer exercises
control over the employee, the employer has a duty to take
such action as a reasonably prudent employer under the
same or similar circumstances would take to prevent the
employee from causing an unreasonable risk of harm to
others. Such a duty may be analogized to cases in which a







126. Id. at 309.
127. Id. at 309 (citations omitted). Cf Meany v. Newell, 367 N.W.2d 472, 474-76
(Minn. 1985) (employer's duty to control arises when employee is on the premises,
using employer's chattel or where employer knows or has reason to know of his abil-
ity to control employee and knows of need to exercise control) (dicta).
1988]
19
Kaplan et al.: Drug and Alcohol Testing in the Workplace: The Employers' Perspec
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1988
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
over a dangerous person when there is recognizable great
danger of harm to third persons. Additionally, we adopt
the rule from cases in this Restatement area that the duty of
the employer or one who can exercise charge over a danger-
ous person is not an absolute duty to insure safety, but re-
quires only reasonable care.1 2
8
Thus, the court determined that the employer could be held
liable under the circumstances.
III. THE RATIONALE BEHIND EMPLOYEE TESTING
A. Legal Theories
Based on the foregoing cases, a strong argument can be
made for the implementation of drug and alcohol testing in the
workplace. Employers can be held liable for an employee's
torts under a variety of legal theories, including: negligent hir-
ing, negligent retention, negligent supervision, failure to exer-
cise control, respondeat superior and negligent entrustment.
The legal theories under which an employer can be held liable
hinge upon whether or not a reasonable investigation occurred
in light of the potential risks of thejob and the foreseeability of
injury. Failure to make a reasonable investigation may result
in large compensatory and punitive damage awards against the
employer. Given statistical evidence that a large percentage of
the American work force abuses drugs or alcohol, many
employers are left in a precarious position. They must either
forego testing and accept the risk of an alcohol or drug-related
accident, test employees or applicants and accept the possibil-
ity of a suit for constitutional or civil rights violations, or find
an alternative way to uncover facts concerning an employee or
applicant's drug and alcohol habits.
Limited drug testing appears to be the most reasonable solu-
tion for both the employee and the employer. To forego test-
ing not only exposes the employer to liability, but also exposes
co-workers and the public to the risk of injury as the result of a
drug or alcohol-induced accident. A narrowly crafted drug
testing program could be limited, for example, to job appli-
128. Otis, 668 S.W.2d at 311 (citation omitted). The doctrine of negligent entrust-
ment has also been used to hold employers liable in some circumstances. See, e.g.,
Thomason v. Harper, 162 Ga. App. 441, 450-51, 289 S.E.2d 773, 782 (1982) ( suffi-
cient evidence of prior reckless driving and of salesman driving after drinking, which
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cants, employees who objectively appear to exhibit signs of
substance abuse, or employees involved in work-related acci-
dents and would protect both the employee and the employer,
with minimal intrusion into the employee's private affairs.
Therefore, a job applicant would be on notice that the poten-
tial job requires a prerequisite drug test, and most workers
would be free from random testing, notwithstanding a "rea-
sonable suspicion" or a job-related accident. Rather than rep-
rimanding workers for suspicion of substance abuse, employers
would have an objective test upon which to base their allega-
tions. Drug testing is relatively inexpensive1 29 and protects the
privacy of the employee more than polygraph tests, which can
address a number of incidents concerning the worker's past
history along with off-work habits. 13
0
Several interesting legal issues may arise as a result of em-
ployee testing. If, for example, an employer implements a
drug and alcohol testing program for applicants and an appli-
cant tests positive, liability for any later accident which is alco-
hol or drug-related may be imputed to the employer. Liability
would be based on the theory that once a positive test had oc-
curred, the accident was "foreseeable." On the other hand, a
negative urine test may provide an escape from liability for the
employer, if an employee is involved in a drug or alcohol-re-
lated accident at a later time. To date there are no cases focus-
ing on employees who have been involved in accidents which
were drug or alcohol-related after a drug and alcohol testing
program has been implemented.
B. The Minnesota Drug Testing Statute 13
Minnesota has recently enacted a drug and alcohol testing
129. Alcohol & Drugs in the Workplace, supra note 21, at 30 (the most widely used
urine test, the immuno-assay technique, costs as little as ten dollars per test).
130. Twenty-one states, including Minnesota, prohibit employers from requiring
that an individual submit to a polygraph test as a condition of employment. Twenty-
eight states have statutes requiring that the examiners be licensed. Nagle, The Poly-
graph in the Workplace, 18 U. RICH. L. REV. 43, 67 (1983).
131. MINN. STAT. § 181.951 (Supp. 1987). Minnesota's drug statute is apparently
inconsistent with section 181.75 of Minnesota Statutes, which prohibits polygraph
testing in the employment context. MINN. STAT. § 181.75 (1986). However, the
distinction lies, inter alia, in that polygraph testing is geared toward theft prevention,
while drug testing is geared toward safety and efficiency.
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statute which took effect September 1, 1987.132 The drug test-
ing law clearly provides that private employers may conduct
across-the-board testing of current employees only in connec-
tion with an annual physical exam, while random drug testing
is permitted for persons in safety-sensitive positions. 33 All
other testing of employees must be based on the employer's
reasonable suspicion that the employees are under the influ-
ence of drugs or alcohol, unless the employee is currently un-
dergoing evaluation or treatment or unless two years have not
yet passed since the employee was in a prescribed treatment
program. 13
4
The statute also regulates the content of an employer's drug
132. MINN. STAT. § 181.951 (Supp. 1987). The Minnesota statute provides in per-
tinent part:
[ 181.951] [AUTHORIZED DRUG AND ALCOHOL TESTING]
Subd. 1. Limitations on Testing. (a) An employer may not request or re-
quire an employee or job applicant to undergo drug and alcohol testing
except as authorized in this section ....
Subd. 2. Job Applicant Testing. An employer may request or require a job
applicant to undergo drug and alcohol testing provided a job offer has been
made to the applicant and the same test is requested or required of all job
applicants conditionally offered employment for that position ....
Subd. 3. Routine Physical Examination Testing. An employer may request
or require an employee to undergo drug and alcohol testing as part of a
routine physical examination provided the drug or alcohol test is requested
or required no more than once annually and the employee has been given at
least two weeks' written notice that a drug or alcohol test may be requested
or required as part of the physical examination.
Subd. 4. Random Testing. An employer may request or require only em-
ployees in safety-sensitive positions to undergo drug and alcohol testing on
a random selection basis.
Subd. 5. Reasonable Suspicion Testing. An employer may request or re-
quire an employee to undergo drug and alcohol testing if the employer has
a reasonable suspicion that the employee:
(1) is under the influence of drugs or alcohol;
(2) has violated the employer's written work rules prohibiting the use,
possession, sale, or transfer of drugs or alcohol while the employee is
working or while the employee is on the employer's premises or operat-
ing the employer's vehicle, machinery, or equipment, provided the
work rules are in writing and contained in the employer's written drug
and alcohol testing policy;
(3) has sustained a personal injury, as that term is defined in section
176.011, subdivision 16, or has caused another employee to sustain a
personal injury; or
(4) has caused a work-related accident or was operating or helping to
operate machinery, equipment, or vehicles involved in a work-related
accident.
MINN. STAT. § 181.951 (Supp. 1987).
133. Id. § 181.951, subds. 3-4.
134. Id. § 181.951, subds. 5-6.
[Vol. 14
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testing policy 35 and requires that notice of the drug testing
policy be given to all individuals affected.1 36 The drug testing
policy must be in wriing and must identify, inter alia, (1) the
employees or job applicants to which the test applies, and
(2) the right of the individual to refuse to submit to the test
and the consequences thereof.1 37 Finally, the law prohibits an
employer from requiring an employee or job applicant to un-
dergo drug and alcohol testing on an "arbitrary or capricious
basis."1
38
Minnesota's drug testing law is consistent with the rationale
behind employers' liability. Case law holds that an employer
must make an investigation of an employee's background com-
mensurate with the risks that the potential job encompasses.1 39
Drug testing of prospective employees can provide a useful
start for investigating an applicant's background. Also, indi-
vidualized testing of employees exhibiting signs of abuse is
consistent with the negligent retention theory. If an employer
hires an individual and retains the employee after the em-
ployer discovers or should discover dangerous propensities
which eventually cause injury, the employer can be held lia-
ble. 140 Testing based on individualized suspicion serves an ac-
cident-preventative function, as well as providing protection
for employers in the event of a lawsuit. Routine testing as part
of an annual physical exam also promotes the societal goal of a
drug-free environment by providing a powerful deterrent to
drug use. In addition, routine testing provides a mechanism
for employers to test employees hired prior to the implementa-
tion of a testing program and protects the privacy rights of em-
ployees. Workers who show no signs of substance abuse and
who have not been involved in work-related accidents only
have to undergo the procedure once a year and are put on no-
tice as to when the annual exam would take place. Addition-
ally, the Minnesota statute prohibits testing except pursuant to
a written drug testing policy, which must contain specific infor-
mation, including who may be tested, the circumstances of
testing and the individual's rights under the policy and the
135. Id. § 181.952, subd. 1.
136. Id. § 181.952, subd. 2.
137. Id. §§ 181.951, subd. 1(b); 181.952, subd. 1.
138. Id. § 181.951, subd. 1(c).
139. See generally supra note 37 and accompanying text.
140. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
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law. 14 1
Given the potential for large damage awards against employ-
ers for employee torts, annual testing represents a compro-
mise between the privacy rights of the worker and the
workplace rights of the employer. The provision of the Minne-
sota statute which proscribes testing on an "arbitrary or capri-
cious" basis provides an important safeguard for employees
who are discriminated against under the guise of "reasonable
suspicion."' 42 Significantly, the Minnesota statute also prohib-
its termination following the first confirmed positive urine
test.143 An employee can be terminated only after he has had
the opportunity to participate in a rehabilitation program at his
own expense or under an employee benefit plan and either
fails to complete the program or records a second confirmed
positive urine test later on. 144 This provision of the statute is
extremely important, because it protects the rights of workers
while working at a solution for the nation's drug problem.
IV. THE LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF DRUG TESTING
Civil libertarians strongly argue that drug testing violates a
fundamental right to privacy.' 45 Under the United States Con-
stitution, citizens enjoy a constitutional right to privacy"46 and
protection against unreasonable governmental searches and
seizures.14 7 Similarly, some states have either statutory or con-
stitutional "right to privacy" provisions. 48 Federal constitu-
tional protections against invasion of privacy and unreasonable
searches and seizures apply only to governmental conduct and
do not reach private industry unless "state action" is found to
exist. The test for determining whether or not state action ex-
ists focuses on:
(1) whether and to what extent the state subsidizes the actions
of the private entity;
(2) whether and to what extent the state regulates the private
employer;
141. MINN. STAT. §§ 181.951, subd. l(b); 181.952, subd. I (Supp. 1987).
142. Id. § 181.951, subd. 5.
143. Id. § 181.953, subd. 10(b).
144. Id. § 181.953, subd. 10(b)(1), (2).
145. See Chapman, supra note 3, at 58.
146. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
147. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
148. See Cecere and Rosen, supra note 7, at 865.
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(3) whether the private entity is performing a function which
has been the exclusive prerogative of the state; and
(4) whether a symbiotic relationship exists between the state
and the private entity.1
49
Because relatively few private employers can be found to fall
within the provisions of the "state action" test, employees ob-
jecting to drug and alcohol testing programs have little re-
course; however, there may be common law remedies for
invasion of privacy and defamation in some situations.1 50
On invasion of privacy grounds, many employees have ar-
gued that drug and alcohol testing are an intolerable intrusion,
which violate the right to privacy and threaten an individual's
sense of personal freedom and dignity.' 5' The Restatement
(Second) of Torts section 652B provides in pertinent part:
"One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon
the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or
concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his
privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reason-
able person."
52
In Satterfield v. Lockheed Missiles and Space Co., 153 Satterfield,
an electronics missile technician, was terminated from a com-
pany after testing positive to a urine screening test as part of a
yearly physical. 154 Subsequently, Satterfield and his wife
brought a variety of "wrongful discharge" claims, including in-
vasion of privacy. 155 In rejecting the plaintiff's invasion of pri-
vacy claim, the court stated:
When a plaintiff bases an action for invasion of privacy on
"intrusion" alone, bringing forth no evidence of public
disclosure, it is incumbent upon him to show a blatant and
149. See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1003-05 (1982); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn,
457 U.S. 830, 839-43 (1982).
150. "State action" has been found in at least one instance of a heavily regulated
industry. See Shoemaker v. Handel, 619 F. Supp. 1089 (D.N.J. 1985), aff'd, 795 F.2d
1136 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 577 (1986) (urine testing ofjockeys).
151. See Chapman, supra note 3, at 57-58.
152. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977). To date, Minnesota has
not recognized the tort of invasion of privacy, nor has it, however, specifically re-
jected the claim. See Price v. Viking Press, Inc., 625 F. Supp. 641, 651 (D. Minn.
1985); Hendry v. Conner, 303 Minn. 317, 318-19, 226 N.W.2d 921, 923 (1975);
House v. Sports Films & Talents, Inc., 351 N.W.2d 684, 685 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
153. 617 F. Supp. 1359 (D.S.C. 1985).
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shocking disregard of his rights, and serious mental
or physical injury or humiliation to himself resulting
therefrom. 
5 6
Because the test results were not disclosed publicly, and be-
cause a urine test was found not to be a shockingly unreasona-
ble intrusion, the Satterfields' claims failed.'
57
The unreasonable intrusion category of the privacy tort does
not require any publicity of the intrusion. 58 The intrusion
makes the defendant subject to liability.' 59 There is no liabil-
ity, however, "unless the interference with the [individual's]
seclusion is a substantial one, of a kind that would be highly
offensive to the ordinary reasonable [person], as the result of
conduct to which the reasonable [person] would strongly ob-
ject." 60 The highly offensive intrusion element of the privacy
tort, however, is substantially high and very difficult to sat-
isfy. 16 1 Therefore, while it is difficult to forecast how courts
will decide the drug testing issue, the common law elements of
invasion of privacy suggest that employees who object to
urinalysis have a difficult burden to hurdle.'
62
In addition to a common law action for invasion of privacy, a
false light invasion of privacy action might be maintained if
publicity is given to a matter that places someone before the
public in a false light:
[I]f (a) the false light in which the other was placed would
156. Id. at 1370 (citing Shorter v. Retail Credit Co., 251 F. Supp. 329 (D.S.C.
1966)).
157. Id. But cf O'Brien v. Papa Gino's of America, Inc., 780 F.2d 1067 (lst Cir.
1986) (polygraph testing for drug use held to be an invasion of privacy, and award to
employee of $358,000 for lost wages on the privacy claim was not clearly against the
weight of evidence).
158. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B comment a (1977).
159. Id. comment b.
160. Id. comment d.
161. See, e.g., Satterfield, 617 F. Supp. at 1370; K-Mart Corp. Store No. 7441 v.
Trotti, 677 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (searching of employee's locker not of
such magnitude as to cause ordinary individual to feel severely offended, humiliated
or outraged).
162. See, e.g., McDonell v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 1302, 1308 (8th Cir. 1987) (urinalysis
is not as intrusive as body searches or blood tests); Turner v. Fraternal Order of
Police, 500 A.2d 1005, 1009 (D.C. App. 1985) (urine testing requires only a normal
bodily function which is not an extreme body invasion). But see Tucker v. Dickey, 613
F. Supp. 1124, 1129-30 (W.D. Wis. 1985) (urinalysis is as intrusive as a body search
or blood test); Caruso v. Ward, 506 N.Y.S.2d 789 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986) (a compelling
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be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) the actor
had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the
falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which
the other would be placed.
163
Like defamation, however, this form of privacy tort is limited
to situations in which the information is publicly dissemi-
nated. ' 64 Thus, employers who test for drugs can easily defeat
false light and defamation claims by keeping test results
confidential. 165
Both defamation and false light actions require "falsity" as a
precondition for recovery. 166 In the drug and alcohol context,
one who disseminates a "false-positive" test result to others
may be subject to a defamation or false light cause of action. 167
In fact, at least one employee has successfully sued for defama-
tion based on false-positive test results. 168 Moreover, the Cen-
ters for Disease Control's monitoring program has produced
evidence that the testing process for commonly abused drugs
163. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (1977).
164. Minnesota does not recognize false light actions. Defamation actions, on the
other hand, are plausible when released information tends to injure an individual's
reputation and expose the individual to public hatred, contempt, ridicule or degrada-
tion. See Phipps v. Clark Oil & Ref. Corp., 408 N.W.2d 569, 573 (Minn. 1987);
Church of Scientology of Minn. v. Minnesota State Medical Ass'n Found., 264
N.W.2d 152, 155 (Minn. 1978).
165. See, e.g., W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & P. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON
ON THE LAW OF TORTS 797-98 (5th ed. 1984).
166. See id. at 802, 863-65.
167. A number of substances are known to cause "false-positive" test results.
They include skin pigment, passive marijuana smoke, poppy seeds and herbal tea.
See generally Maugh, Drug Tests' Reliability is Limited, Experts Say, L.A. Times, Oct. 27,
1986, § 1, at 20-21. The fallabilities of drug testing can be used effectively to prove a
false-positive test result and bolster a defamation or false light cause of action. At a
minimum, they should be considered by a company that is about to institute a drug
testing program.
168. Houston Belt & Terminal Ry. Co. v. Wherry, 548 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. Civ. App.
1976) (plaintiff reportedly had a trace of methadone in his system; jury allowed
$150,000 in compensatory and $50,000 in punitive damages). Allowing suits for
false-positives not only protects the rights of wrongfully terminated workers, but pro-
vides an impetus for employers to double check the accuracy of the test results. The
private laboratories are largely unregulated and may not perform back-up tests due
to the additional expense. Given that a positive test result could ruin a worker's
entire career, strict regulation of drug testing on the employer's and on the testing
laboratory's sides should be required. See Maugh, supra note 98, at 20. Minnesota's
drug testing statute has anticipated this problem and establishes a licensing program
for testing laboratories. MINN. STAT. § 181.952 (Supp. 1987). The program is ad-
ministered by the Department of Health, and the statute requires employers to use
licensed testing laboratories. Id. § 181.953.
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is substantially less than perfect. 169 The errors from the
thirteen laboratories screened ranged from 0 to 100% for
cocaine, 11 to 94% for barbiturates and 19 to 100% for
amphetamines. 
70
In addition to common law remedies, an individual who is
fired for substance abuse may find redress under federal or
state rehabilitation laws. Persons with histories of drug use are
"handicapped individuals" within the meaning of the Federal
Rehabilitation Act. 171 The Minnesota Human Rights Act clas-
sifies a disabled person as any person who has a physical or
mental impairment which substantially limits one or more ma-
jor life activities. 72 Thus, under both of these acts, it may be
possible for an individual with a drug or alcohol problem to
recover lost wages.
CONCLUSION
Due to the employer's potential liability under the negligent
hiring and respondeat superior theories, employers have a
strong legal basis for arguing that they should be allowed to
test employees for drug and alcohol abuse. Minnesota's drug
testing statute represents a beneficial compromise between
employee privacy and employer rights. Important safeguards
have been incorporated into the statute which should protect
workers while allowing employers the latitude to test under
limited circumstances. Above all, the statute provides a care-
fully constructed framework for solving the problem of alcohol
and drug use in the workplace.
169. See Hansen, Crisis in Drug Testing, 253J. AM. MED. Ass'N 2382-83 (1985).
170. Id. at 2382. Blood tests are clearly more intrusive than urine tests, but indi-
cate impairment with greater accuracy. Alcohol & Drugs in the Workplace, supra note 2 1,
at 32.
171. Davis v. Bucher, 451 F. Supp. 791 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (persons with histories of
drug use are handicapped individuals).
172. MINN. STAT. § 363.01, subd. 25 (1986).
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